This paper describes the evolution of the tax treatment of investment in R&D in Australia, Canada, France, Great Britain, Germany, Italy, Japan and the USA between 1979 and 1994. Estimates of the cost of R&D capital are provided and the methodology used is contrasted with other ones used in the literature. Four ndings are highlighted. First, there appear to be substantial di¤erences in the cost of R&D capital across countries at any given point in time. Secondly, there has been a general trend towards more generous tax treatment of R&D, although some countries have moved much more rapidly than others. Thirdly, there is an increasing diversity in the cost of R&D capital between countries, a pattern that is in stark contrast to the convergence in the tax treatment of physical capital.
Introduction
Throughout the industrialised world, and in the emerging economies of South-East Asia, there has been a general growth in proportion of GDP allocated to privately funded research and development (R&D) activities (see Figure 1 .1). Although there is controversy surrounding the causes of this phenomenon and the reasons why some countries have experienced faster growth than others, it is commonly agreed that industrial production and global competition are increasingly based on the introduction of new technologies.
In parallel with this empirical development, theorists of economic growth have formalised Schumpeters notion that investment in intangible assets (such as R&D and human capital) is the crucial factor in generating faster rates of output growth. R&D is likely to be under provided in market economies for a variety of reasons. Most famously, R&D generates new information and information is a partially non-rival good. In the absence of a perfectly functioning patent system, this will lead to socially sub-optimal levels of R&D. Imperfections in other markets, which provide complementary assets to R&D, will reinforce this problem. For example, low levels of training or poor access to nancial markets will tend to have a depressing e¤ect on R&D investment.
!
Given these empirical and theoretical developments it is not surprising that policy makers have become concerned with the impact of the tax system on the economys innovative capacity. In particular many countries have turned to exSee Van Reenen (1996) . See, inter alia, Aghion and Howitt (1992) , Grossman and Helpman (1991) .
For evidence of failures in the market for skills see Booth and Snower (1996) ; for evidence of failure in credit markets for R&D see Himmelburg and Peterson (1995) . the United States, is that the e¤ects could be substantial. This paper takes an international approach examining eight major industrialised countries (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and the USA). We extend previous cross-country studies by examining the evolution of the e¤ects of the tax systems in these countries over a sixteen year period (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) .
The methodology used in this paper is an extension to R&D expenditures of the King and Fullerton (1984) approach to calculating the e¤ects of tax on the costs of physical capital. It is a useful method of summarising the inuence of di¤erent parts of a complex tax system into a single, quantitative measure.
The cost of R&D capital across countries estimates the extent to which di¤erent 2 countries subsidise or penalise R&D investments relative to a no-tax regime. This enables valid cross-country comparisons to be made. Calculating such measures is a novel exercise which provides a valuable data resource for future researchers.
A substantial part of the paper is therefore devoted (in Appendix A) to a careful documentation of this methodology and a critical comparison with the existing approaches. For similar reasons, Appendix B gives summary details of the tax treatment of R&D expenditures in di¤erent countries. The e¤ects of tax on the cost of R&D are illustrated in two ways in this paper. First, we calculate the cost of R&D capital for a representative rm earning the full amount of credit to capture the upper bound of the e¤ects of R&D tax credit systems. This measure does not, however, reect the heterogeneous way the tax system can a¤ect rms.
To illustrate this variety the impact of four of the tax systems are simulated on a sample of rm level data. However, we do not attempt the more complex task of examining what the e¤ects of changes in the cost of capital are on the actual amount of R&D performed.
"
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 outlines the approach taken to measuring the cost of R&D capital in this paper; section 3 briey summarises previous studies. Section 4 describes the general trends in tax systems and the tax treatment of R&D over the 1980s and 1990s. In Section 5 some simulations of the e¤ects of di¤erent tax systems are performed and some concluding comments o¤ered in Section 6. To pre-empt our conclusions, the key ndings are that: (i)
there is substantial variation in the cost of R&D between countries; (ii) there exists a general downward trend in these costs, (iii) variation in the cost of capital " See Hall (1995) or Gri¢th, Sandler and Van Reenen (1995) for critical surveys of studies examining these e¤ects. 3 increased over the period; (iv) the design and implementation rules of R&D tax credits can have a large impact on the distribution of e¤ective tax rates on R&D.
Measuring the Cost of R&D Capital
This section lays out the methodology used to calculate the impact of the tax system on the cost of R&D capital. This methodology was developed in King and Fullerton (1984) and used in OECD (1991). The idea is to derive a single quantitative measure to summarise the e¤ects of a complex set of tax regulations on the cost of performing R&D. This is the pre-tax real rate of return on the marginal investment project that is required to earn a minimum rate of return after tax.
# It will be a function of the general tax system, economic variables and the treatment of R&D expenditure in particular. To focus purely on the tax e¤ects, economic variables such as ination and interest rates are held equal across countries.
The details of the calculation are briey given here and detailed in Appendix A. Consider an investment project with a present discounted value of
where p is the rate of return, ¿ is the statutory tax rate, ± is the economic depreciation rate, ½ is the rms discount rate and ¼ is the rate of ination. The discount rate is the rate of return that is just su¢cient to satisfy the providers of capital. It will depend on the form of nance used in both the parent and the subsidiary. When the investment in R&D is nanced by retained earnings, and # In this paper we assume a real hurdle rate of return of 5%.
4 the marginal investor is tax exempt, the discount rate is equal to the nominal interest rate, i.
The initial cost of the investment, net of tax, is unity and after tax is dened by,
where A is the net present discounted value of depreciation allowances and tax credits on the assets. For the marginal project, where the net present value is equal to the cost, the minimum required pre-tax rate of return $ is given by:
The cost of R&D capital in the absence of tax is given by the real interest rate (r). Below we present calculations of the tax wedge which is the additional return needed to cover taxes and is given by p ¡ r.
Previous Work
Previous empirical work that has measured the impact of tax on the cost of R&D capital has largely examined the evolution of the US R&D tax credit. This was introduced in the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 and subsequently reformed several times. One of the most studied features of this tax credit has been the impact that the way in which incremental spending is dened has on the e¤ective value of the credit. For most of the life of the credit the base has been dened as spending above the average of the previous three years spending. A pioneering $ Note that this is di¤erent than the King-Fullerton approach where the minimum required pre-tax rate of return is considered net of economic depreciation so p = ¡A ¡¿ (½ + ± ¡ ¼) ¡ ±. 5 study by Eisner, Albert and Sullivan (1984) evaluated the impact of the tax credit using a measure of the marginal e¤ective tax credit (METC). They highlighted the fact that the net present value of the credit was substantially less than the statutory rate. The METC measures the discounted present value of the credit on an extra unit of R&D -that is, it accounts for the future stream of marginal benets that will accrue from the credit. Although the statutory rate of the credit was 25 per cent, they found the METC to be very low -on average zero for 1980 and 4 per cent for 1981 -and negative for around one-fth of rms. A negative METC can arise when a rm is considering an increase in its R&D spending that will leave it below the base in its current year, but expects to be above the base in subsequent years. No tax credits will accrue from the increase in R&D in the current year, but the increased base will reduce the size of the credit in subsequent years. This surprising feature of the tax credit arose for three main reasons: the incremental nature of the credit; the company-specic moving-average denition of the base; and the fact that many rms (ranging between 14 per cent and 43 per cent) could not claim the credit due to tax exhaustion. In a study using rm level tax return data Altshuler (1988) examined the impact of the US tax credit, taking into account the dynamics of the rms tax position. Her main nding was, for companies with no tax liability, the necessity of carrying forward non-indexed credits and the discounting of future returns dramatically reduced the incentives provided by R&D credits. A large number of rms were in this position: in 1981 nearly three-quarters, although this had dropped to just over one-half by 1984. Hall (1993) extended Eisner et al.(1984) by calculating a measure of the after tax price of R&D, µ t , which included a value of the depreciation allowances, as well as tax credits. Her estimates showed the considerable heterogeneity of the METC facing her sample of about 1,000 rms, both at a point of time and over time. She concluded that one of the signicant advantages of moving to a xed based scheme in the 1990s was the reduction in this variation in the tax price facing di¤erent U.S. rms. treated as an investment -that is, its full value is not realised immediately but accrues over several years. ' Current expenditure on R&D is assumed to depreciate at 30% a year, buildings at 3.61% and plant and machinery at 12.64%. It is also assumed that tax changes are not anticipated and that rms expect the current tax system to continue into the indenite future (see Appendix A for some further discussion of this assumption). To examine the di¤erences in the tax wedge across di¤erent types of assets the King-Fullerton measure, net of depreciation, is more informatative. The extent to which investment in these assets is taxed or subsidised is, in part, determined by the degree to which depreciation rates allowed by the tax system di¤er from the economic depreciation rate.
The depreciation rates for buildings and plant and machinery are taken from OECD (1991). In most empirical work it is between 15%-30%: see the survey in Mairesse and Sassenou (1991). Hall (1993) emphasises that companies may have been reluctant to commit themselves to large changes in their R&D programmes in the early years of the US credit due to worries about its longevity. however, as it is amongst the more generous countries in 1980, but has had a broadly stable system. Japan is the only country in this group which has an R&D tax credit.
Note that Japan gives a range of additional tax credits for specic types of R&D. For example, small and medium sized rms can elect to receive 6% of total expenditures as a credit (limited to 15% of the rms tax bill). Additional R&D tax credits are also available for: (i)
Another striking feature of Figure 3 .1 is the fact that the range of the tax wedges at the end of the period is greater than at the start. In 1979 the mean e¤ective marginal tax wedge on the typical R&D investment was -0.5 with a standard deviation of 1.6. By 1994 the mean had fallen to -3.7 and the standard deviation increased to 4.8. This contrasts strongly with the tax wedge on the typical investment in physical capital which has shown a tendency towards convergence over this period.
" For example, in 1979 the average tax wedge on physical investment was 3.1 with a standard deviation of 1.8. By 1994 this had fallen to a mean of 2.6 with a standard deviation of 1.2. The fall is more dramatic if we consider the G7 (excluding Japan). In 1979 the mean was 2.7 with a standard deviation of 1.9, falling by 1994 to 2.4 with a standard deviation of 0.73.
How sensitive are the estimates of the cost of R&D capital to the assumptions underlying the calculations? The results are not sensitive to changes in the appropriate rate of depreciation for R&D capital -a variable for which there are few reliable estimates. For example when the rate is changed from 30% to 15% the main features of Figure 2 remain the same.
Recall that in Figures 3.1 to 3.3 we have been considering a typical R&D investment, which is 90% current expenditure. Current expenditure of any sort is fully deductible in all countries which means that only subsidies through tax credits and superdeductibility a¤ect the tax wedge for this asset. However, expenditure on plant and machinery and buildings are not fully deductible, therefore, depreciation allowances have a signicant impact on the tax wedge for these assets.
The di¤erent rankings of the tax wedge on these assets mirror those found with investment in promotion of basic technology -7% of total expenditure; (ii) R&D carried out in cooperation with government -6% of total expenditure.
"
For a more detailed discussion of this issue see Gri¢th (1996) . The tax wedge varies signicantly with the type of nancing for investment in R&D, as it does with investment in physical capital. However, survey evidence strongly conrms that R&D is overwhelmingly nanced from internal earnings.
# Di¤erent assumptions about the rates of interest and ination would also change the tax wedge, however, the overall patterns and conclusions remain the same.
Simulations
The tax wedges presented above do not reect the substantial heterogeneity in the marginal tax rates that di¤erent rms face. For example, the impact of the various capping rules are not incorporated into the tax wedge. Furthermore, the cost of R&D capital is not informative about the scale of likely revenue costs relative to the amount of new R&D we might expect to be generated. This section attempts to address these two issues. In order to illustrate the di¤erential way in which these credits will impact on rms, we have simulated four of the tax credits using a sample of R&D performing rms.
A sample of 244 rms were taken from the UK Stock Market. Since the tax system in the UK has always been broadly neutral with respect to R&D spending the data seem a good baseline case. Data on the amount of R&D undertaken, sales, and tax liability is taken from the published accounts for the years 1989 to 1993. The various tax systems are then applied to these rms, as described below. The numbers reported in Table 1 The distribution of tax credits paid out to rms is di¤erent across the various systems. This is summarised in the concentration measure, which is the percentage of total credit paid going to the rms getting the ve largest credits. Because R&D is very heavily concentrated, unless the credit is capped, the benets go disproportionately to the larger rms. Under the Australian and USA systems the top ve rms alone get more than half of the amount of credits paid out, while in Canada they get just under half. Where a credit has an absolute cap, as under the French system, the distribution of the credit is much more skewed to smaller rms. The largest ve get only 11% of the amount of credit paid out. This low cap was an explicit policy of the French government which sought to encourage more innovation amongst smaller rms.
The nal rows of Table 1 give estimates of the revenue cost and of the expected ' The gure for Australia is 99.6% because one rm falls below the £5,000 R&D threshold.
17 amount of new R&D spending that would be generated by the credit. Given that we have assumed an elasticity of -1 these two numbers di¤er because rms are tax exhausted or have hit the limit of a cap, and therefore their METC is zero, or because the moving average denition of the base has reduced their METC.
The Australian and Canadian systems are signicantly more costly than those in
France and the USA. Nevertheless, the USA scheme generates $0.82 of R&D for every $1 lost in tax revenue, which is higher than any of the other systems. The
French system appears to be particularly poor at generating new R&D given its cost to the state.
None of these simulations should be taken as denitive given the strong assumptions underlying them and the particular sample of rms used. Nevertheless, they do illustrate that the impact of tax schemes varies substantially between companies. They also indicate the general order of magnitude of the costs and benets of di¤erent systems.
Summary and Conclusions
Despite the widespread concern that policy makers and economists have expressed over the amount of innovative activity undertaken, quantitative assessments of technology policies across countries are rare. In this paper we consider the e¤ects of tax systems on the cost of R&D capital in eight countries over sixteen years. The reasons for the turbulence were country-specic, but were not all due to changes in the tax credit rate. More typically large changes were due to changes in the way the base was calculated or due to changes in other parts of the tax system. To address the issue of heterogeneity in the cost induced by di¤erent tax positions and capping a simple simulation exercise was carried out. This illustrates the degree to which the benets of tax credits are usually highly concentrated amongst a few rms.
What is described in this paper is essentially a panel of countries with data on changes in the cost of capital induced by policy experiments. We have seen that there is considerable heterogeneity between countries over time. Such changes, if exogenous, give researchers a rare opportunity to exploit the e¤ects of tax-price variation on capital demands -for R&D as well as other intangible and tangible investments.
A. Measuring the Net Present Value of Allowances and Credits
The net present value (NPV) of depreciation allowances and tax credits is given by
where A d is the net present value of depreciation allowances and A c is the net present value of tax credits. The value of A d depends on the depreciation rates allowed and whether depreciation is using the straight line or declining balance method.
There are several types of tax credits available on R&D expenditure. The main features of these credits are whether they apply to total or incremental expenditure and how the base expenditure is dened in the incremental case. The net present value of the credit is given by
where D c is the proportion of R&D that is deducted from taxable income, ¿ is the statutory corporate tax rate and ¿ c is the statutory credit rate.
Where credits apply to incremental expenditure the NPV depends on how the base is dened. The denitions of base that are made in the eight countries are: (i) last years expenditure, (ii) the previous largest expenditure, (iii) a xed year in the past, (iv) an average of the last two years expenditures, (v) an average of the last three years expenditures. All of these can be in real or nominal terms. We model (i) and (ii) as the same and assume that (iii) has no impact on the net present value of the credit.
Under the assumption of positive current and expected future growth in R&D spending, the net present value of the incremental credit is given by,
where K is the number of years over which expenditure is averaged to dene the base, and r is the discount rate. If the credit is on real expenditure (as in France) then A c is divided by ( where p r t is the price of R&D investment in the absence of taxes, T t is a dummy that indicates whether a rm has taxable income in the current year, r is the rms discount rate, j is the number of years before any loss carryforwards will be exhausted (usually equal to zero), ¿ t is the corporate tax rate,´t is the share of qualied R&D expenditure, and ERC t is the e¤ective rate of R&E tax credit. The ERC t is computed using a similar formula to the Eisners METC (equation (A.3) ), suitably modied to take account of changes in the tax law since 1984. Halls measure µ t is equivalent to the value 1 ¡ A c if p r t is scaled to one and the rm is assumed to have a su¢cient tax liability in all years against which to o¤set the credit. Finally, an alternative measure called the B-index was used by Warda (1994) among others. This is the critical (minimum) before tax benet/cost ratio. The formula for the B-index is,
where AT C is the after tax cost of $1 of R&D and ¿ is the statutory tax rate. There are several criticisms common to these measures. First, the exact denition of qualiable R&D di¤ers across countries. In the U.S., for example, the part of R&D designated for enhancing foreign sales was treated di¤erently from the rest (see Hines, 1994) . Secondly, the value of the credit will also depend on whether or not the credit is capped. In some countries there are absolute caps while in others there are proportional caps. It is assumed that the investments fall between any maximum caps or minimum expenditure thresholds. Thirdly, in calculating the tax wedge we have assumed that rms are expecting their R&D to grow. If rms where planning to hold or cut their R&D investment the cost of capital would di¤er due to the denitions of the base, as illustrated in the simulations.
A nal di¢culty relates to the role of expectations. We are assuming rms expect the current conditions to last indenitely. One di¢culty is that rms may anticipate a tax change (indeed, it may be preannounced), or they may anticipate a revision of the denition of the base in the future. Even if the base is xed, some revision will eventually occur unless the tax credit is scrapped. Thus, the future base may be linked in some way to current expenditure, and current R&D will be expected to have some impact on the future base. Since the R&D expenditure bases have historically been revised every three or four years on average, this could lead to frequent and large variations in the incentives to undertake R&D by forward looking rms. Judging by the cycle of base revisions over the 1980s in France and the USA, rms in both countries may be expecting an impending revision of the current base and be acting accordingly.
B. Tax Data
This appendix details the tax treatment of expenditure on R&D in eight OECD countries. The tables under each country section give the statutory tax rate on retentions and the net present value of depreciation allowances and tax credits on the three R&D assets considered. The gures show the tax wedge on investment in each of the three assets.
The statutory tax rates shown below are on retained earnings and are based on the rates in force as a result of any change in that calendar year. For example, if the tax rate falls from 35% to 33% on the 31 March 1993, the rate for 1993 is given as 33%. If two changes occurred in one year then only the nal change is recorded. The statutory tax rate includes surcharges or other special taxes that are levied on corporate income at the national level. Where a tax on corporate income is levied at a local level, for example by states or provinces, we have tried to construct an average of these rates to indicate the average additional tax at the local level. This has not always been possible and in several cases the local tax rate is set at the 1991 rate in every year due to lack of information. Where there are local credits on R&D expenditure we have generally taken the most generous. Local taxes only include local corporate income taxes. In general they do not include taxes on property. In many countries local taxes are deductible from the national tax and this is taken into account.
Most countries allow a wide range of depreciation methods and rates. We have, in general, used the most favourable method and rates that are commonly allowed on the various classes of asset. The two most commonly used methods are straightline (SL) and declining balance (DB) depreciation. In addition, many countries give extra rst year allowances or provide accelerated depreciation allowances in the rst few years. In general plant and machinery is depreciated using the DB or a combination of DB and SL methods, while buildings are depreciated using SL.
The gures shown in tables below are the net present value (NPV) of these depreciation allowances, which combines the stream of deductions from taxable income the allowances represent with the statutory tax rate, to produce the current value of these allowances to the company. They are expressed in terms of the present value of the future stream of depreciation allowances on an investment of 100 units of local currency.
For illustrative purposes these NPVs are calculated using a common discount rate to abstract from di¤erences in ination (using 4.5% ination and a real interest rate of 5%). Where depreciation rates are based on unspecied asset lives we assumed that plant and machinery has a useful life of 8 years and buildings of 25 years.
B.1. Australia
Australia introduced a special 150% depreciation allowance for qualifying R&D in 1985: 150% of current expenditure can be written-o¤ in the rst year, plant over three years, and buildings over 40 years. This dramatically reduced the tax wedge on current expenditure and plant and machinery R&D (as shown in Table  1 ), providing a large subsidy for R&D expenditures. This special depreciation allowance did not a¤ect the tax wedge on buildings used for R&D as much, since a rapid three year depreciation provision was already in existence. Qualifying R&D included expenditure on innovation or projects that involved technical risk, and was carried out in Australia for the benet of Australians. Australia is unusual in that it has a minimum threshold of A$50,000 to receive the full 150%, with a sliding scale between A$20,000 and A$50,000, and no additional allowance for expenditure below A$20,000. The fall in the overall tax subsidy in 1988 reects the cut in the statutory tax rate on retentions from 50% to 39% which reduced the value of the additional R&D depreciation allowance. In 1983 a 25% tax credit was introduced on the real increase in qualifying R&D expenditure over last year, with a FF3 million per year cap. This led to a small fall in the tax wedge (as shown in Table 3 ). The credit rate was increased to 50% in 1985 and the cap raised to FF5 million, leading to a further fall in the marginal tax wedge. In 1988 rms were given the choice between the a 50% credit on the increase over the previous years expenditure, with a maximum of FF5 million (increased to FF10 million in certain cases). Alternatively, for the years 1988, 1989, and 1990 they could get a 30% credit on the increase over their 1987 expenditure, up to a maximum of FF3 million. This latter option is worth more to rms expecting to increase their R&D spending and is what we model. Although the headline rate of credit fell (from 50% to 30%) the value of the e¤ective subsidy to R&D increased sharply because the base used to calculate the increase in R&D expenditure was xed at the 1987 level eliminating the impact of current R&D spending on the calculation of the future base. In 1991 the credit returned to 50% on the increase in real expenditure, but the base was extended to the most recent two years and the cap raised to FF40 million. This reduced the e¤ective value of the subsidy due since the base was changed back from a xed base to a moving average. From 1983 to 1986 expenditure on buildings used for scientic research was given an accelerated depreciation allowance of 50% straight line. 
B.4. Germany
There are currently no special tax allowances for R&D. Between 1983 and 1989 industrial buildings and plant and machinery enjoyed limited accelerated depreciation provisions. A building that was at least two-thirds used for R&D purposes could be depreciated at up to 15% of the cost over ve years; or 10% if only one-third used for R&D. Plant and machinery used exclusively for R&D, could receive an additional 8% allowance of up to 40% of the initial cost over ve years. These accelerated depreciation provisions dramatically reduced the marginal tax wedge on plant and machinery and building R&D expenditure as seen in Table  B .4. However, since current R&D accounts for 90% of total R&D expenditure this has not had a large e¤ect on the total R&D tax wedge (see Figure 4 in main body of text). The reduction in the statutory tax rate on retentions from 56% to 45% has reduced the net present value of the deductibility of current expenditure 30 by a far greater amount. No special tax depreciation provisions or credits are given on R&D expenditure. Italys statutory tax rate has risen from 36.3% in 1979 to 53.2% in 1994 and thus increased the marginal e¤ective tax wedge on R&D plant and machinery and R&D building expenditure (see Table B .5). However, the immediate expensing of current R&D expenditure (which accounts for 90% of total R&D expenditure) leaves the total marginal tax wedge relatively una¤ected (see Figure 4 ). These include a 6% credit for small and medium sized rms, a 7% credit for investment to promote basic technology and a 6% credit on R&D carried out in cooperation with government. Since 1954 all R&D expenditure has been fully deductible. The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 introduced a tax credit on incremental R&D expenditure which has remained in place, although there have been many subsequent changes to its design, and the credit has never been made a permanent feature of the tax system. The rules governing the operation of the US tax credit are complex and are only sketched out here. A detailed explanation can be found in Hines (1994) and Hall (1995) . In particular, we do not consider the foreign allocation rules as we consider only purely domestic rms. The statutory rate of the credit was 25% between 1981 and 1985 and has been 20% since then. From 1981 until 1990 incremental expenditure was dened as spending above the average of the 34 last three years expenditure. In 1990 the denition of the base changed to the three year average ratio of R&D over sales (with a maximum of 16%) times sales. In addition, the rules governing the deductibility of the credit have change. Up until 1988 the credit was not deducted from taxable income. In 1989 it was 50% deductible, and from 1990 onwards 100% deductible. The statutory tax rate and net present value of the tax credit is shown in Table B .8. 
